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INTRODUCTION

Coinciding with the dominance of private markets on a global
scale, universities have expanded their role as market actors.' Universities have increased their long-existing commercial activity in sports
programs 2 as well as in the sale of apparel and other goods with the
university name and logo. 3 Even more striking are the universities'
private-market ventures during the past two decades in relation to the
core functions of teaching and research. Capitalizing on the commercial appeal of the genetics "revolution" of the mid-1970s, 4 universities
have expanded their efforts to patent and license inventions discovered by university researchers. 5 The marketing of university research
has been aided by federal legislation, particularly the Bayh-Dole Act of
1980,6 which permits and encourages universities to seek patents on
federally funded research results. 7 The Bayh-Dole Act laid the foundation for increased university-industry relations through corporate licensing of university-owned patents. 8 This contact, in turn, led to
large-scale corporate funding of university research in exchange for
guarantees of exclusive corporate licenses to resulting research patents. 9 In the realm of teaching, universities have adopted business
models in relation to faculty hiring and program development. For
example, universities have dramatically increased employment of nontenure-track faculty, including adjunct faculty and graduate student
teachers, with a corresponding decrease in available tenure-track positions.10 The latest commercial activity in education is universities' creI

See DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF

HIGHER EDUCATION 4-7 (2003).

2 Id. at 35-39.
3 Id. at 2, 37.
4 See Sheldon Krimsky, The Profit of Scientific Discovery and Its Normative Implications, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 17 (1999) (explaining that the 1973 discovery of recombinant DNA
led to the "transition from an analytic to a synthetic science").
5
See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.

6 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-212 (2001)).
7
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and PrivateDevelopment: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1665 (1996).
8 See infta notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
9
See id.
10
See Stanley Aronowitz, The Last Job in America, in CHALK LINES: THE POLITICS OF
WORK IN THE MANAGED UNIVERSITY 216-17 (Randy Martin ed., 1998).
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ation of for-profit spin-off corporations to engage in the business of
Internet-based distance learning programs."
These commercialization trends have been the focus of recent
scholarly commentary from such fields as history, sociology, education, and law.' 2 Derek Bok, former President of Harvard University
and former Dean of Harvard Law School, joins the debate in his book
Universities in the Marketplace: The Commercialization of Higher Education,
inquiring "why this [commercialization] trend has developed, what
dangers it poses for universities, and how academic leaders can act to
limit the risk to their institutions."1 3 Bok defines commercialization as
"efforts within the university to make a profit from teaching, research,
and other campus activities. ' 14 He begins his study of commercialization trends with the oldest of commercialized university activitiesathletics-and then expands the discussion to include more recent
15
commercial activities that involve research and teaching.
In the preface, Bok describes a commencement speech that he
delivered to the Harvard graduating class of 1988.16 This speech recounts a series of dreams in which he faced the challenge of finding
adequate funding to cover the rising costs of university programs.
What began as a dream-with Bok accepting a large loan from a
wealthy alumnus to pay for worthwhile academic programs, faculty salaries, and university facilities-ends as a nightmare of ever-broadening intrusion by outside commercial and corporate interests.17 Faced
with escalating loan payments, the university turns to new commercial
activities to generate profits.1 8 Bok explains that he created this ficti11
See Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Corporatizationof the University: DistanceLearningat the Cost
of Academic Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT'L L.J. 73, 74 (2002).
12
See, e.g., CAPITALIZING KNOWLEDGE: NEW INTERSECTIONS OF INDUSTRY AND ACADEMIA
13-17 (Henry Etzkowitz et al. eds., 1998) (addressing growth in university-industry relations, including spinoff firms from universities, strategic research alliances, and international comparisons); SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF
PROFITS CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003) (discussing the negative effects of monetary incentives for academic scientists on the role of the university); DAVID F. NOBLE, DIGITAL DIPLOMA MILLS: THE AUTOMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2001) (setting out his
critique of the effects of technological change on education); SHEILA SLAUGHTER & LARRY
L. LESLIE, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND THE ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY
3-4 (1997) (outlining the book's efforts to address the changes in faculty and institutions
of higher education); Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 73-77; Randy Martin, EducationAs Na-

tional Pedagogy, Introduction to CHALK LINES, supra note 10, at 19-26 (summarizing the essays in the collection as "cast[ing] a wide net over the current situation of academic labor
in the United States").
13
BOK, supra note 1, at vii.
14 Id. at 3.
15 See id. at 35-56 (discussing athletics' influence on university funding); id at 57-78
(explaining the use of corporate funding for university research); id. at 79-98 (addressing

the recent lure of a profit-making online education alternative).
16
17

18

Id. at vii-x.
Id. at viii-ix.
See id.
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tious dream for the commencement speech to warn students, parents,
and alumni of the threats that university commercialization poses to
academic values. 19 He frames both the dream and the book's inquiry
in terms of his concern that commercial activities in universities may
interfere with universities' traditional character. 2°
Although Bok introduces his book in the context of the nightmarish possibilities of university commercialization, a full reading
reveals that Bok is actually quite positive about the role of commercial
activities in the university. He argues that universities should take a
balanced approach in deciding whether to engage in market activities
and cautions "against deep-seated biases either for or against corporations and market-based solutions" 2 1 to university financial problems.
This call for balance, though, encourages university commercial ventures under the right circumstances. 22 Bok is optimistic about the
value of the profit motive in enhancing the university's efforts to fulfill
its mission, particularly regarding academic research. 2 3 He believes
that the application of business principles of efficiency, quality improvement, and profit incentives can benefit both research and
24
teaching.
This Book Review critiques Bok's advocacy of university market
activities, arguing that they represent a major shift in the university's
traditional mission of engaging in research and teaching for the public good. Bok promotes the positive value of university commercial
activities by applying a narrow definition of university commercialization. He then fails to fully analyze the damage to faculty academic
freedom and the university's public mission of even this narrowed
scope of university commercial activities. Part I of this Review describes Bok's approach to university commercialization, comparing
his positive views of university commercial activities with the historically based presumption against intrusion of the business model into
the university. This Part also presents Bok's recommendation of the
process that the university should follow in deciding whether to enter
into commercial activities. Part II describes Bok's conclusions concerning the merits of specific commercial activities in the university:
athletics, research, and teaching.
Part III critiques Bok's narrow definition of university commercialization and his failure to evaluate commercialization trends within
a broader historical and institutional context. This Part argues that
19

20
21
22
23
24

Id. at x.
Id. at vii, x.
Id. at 33-34.
See id. at 32-34.
See id. at 15-16; infra notes 63-66, 134-39 and accompanying text.
BOK, supra note 1, at 24-29.
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Bok's restricted approach inaccurately describes the scope of commercialization trends. Moreover, Bok fails to apply his own recommendation that universities follow a broad-based decisionmaking process in
evaluating proposals for university commercial activities. Moreover, in
restricting his definition of university commercialization, Bok omits
discussion of important aspects of commercialization trends.
Part IV analyzes the aspects of university commercialization that
Bok does not address, including a broader analysis of the privatization
of the university's mission. This evaluation, in turn, requires a deeper
analysis of university patenting and licensing of academic research results, large-scale corporate funding of university departments and research programs, university adoption of for-profit corporate
structures, and the weakening of faculty academic freedom and tenure. Had Bok included these discussions in his analysis, he would
likely have found it more difficult to reach such positive views of university commercial activities.
I
BOK'S APPROACH TO UNIVERSITY COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES:
TIPPING THE BALANCE IN FAVOR OF UNIVERSITY
COMMERCIALIZATION

The commercial aspects of intercollegiate sports are well known
to most readers: financing of athletic facilities, competition for athletes, radio and television coverage, corporate advertising in sports
programs, and contracts with sports equipment companies. 2 5 Recent
commercial activities in research and teaching may be less familiar. In
the research category, Bok focuses on several developments that have
increased university-industry contacts since the mid-1970s: expanded
patenting and licensing activity by universities as encouraged by the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which permits universities to patent inventions
resulting from federally funded research; 26 growth in corporate funding of university science and medical programs; 27 growth in individual
faculty consulting and research contracts with corporations; 28 and increased faculty entrepreneurial activity as founders of start-up corporations. 29 In the teaching category, Bok primarily addresses the
phenomenon of Internet-based distance learning on a for-profit basis.30 However, he also raises concerns with corporate funding in exchange for public connections to the university-e.g., pharmaceutical
25
26
27
28
29
3o

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

37-38.
11-12,
57-78,
60-62,
61, 67,
79-98,

58-60, 62-63, 77, 139-42.
143-44, 151-53.
66-76, 143-51.
153-55.
169-72.
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and medical supply companies funding continuing medical education
31
in exchange for corporate selection of company-paid lecturers.
As previously noted, Bok's "balanced" approach to university
commercial activities favors university market ventures. On one hand,
he is optimistic about the value of the profit motive to enhance universities' efforts to fulfill their missions, concluding that "new opportunities for earning money have clearly helped make universities more
attentive to public needs. ' 32 For example, Bok finds that the profit
motive underlying the Bayh-Dole Act has enhanced academic research through the growth in university patenting and licensing activities. 33 He concludes that teaching could improve by using the profit
34
motive to encourage faculty to adopt innovative teaching methods.
On the other hand, Bok cautions that "corporate methods and
market models" 3 5-including business principles of consumer demand, efficiency, and profit maximization-are not appropriate for
decisions related to academic matters, such as choosing a curriculum
or a research agenda. 36 Ultimately, Bok concludes, "the ways of the
marketplace are neither consistently useful nor wholly irrelevant in
trying to improve the performance of research universities. That is
what makes the problem of commercialization difficult. Educators
must use their own judgment in deciding when to pursue opportuni37
ties for profit or adopt other business practices.
Bok's perspective is clarified by viewing opinions of university
commercialization along a spectrum of four positions: (1) commercial
activity is always bad; (2) commercial activity is bad, but justifiable
under current economic constraints in higher education; (3) commercial activity is good, within limits that avoid the excesses of private
market activities; and (4) commercial activity is always good. Bok's
views place him in the third position because he supports market activities in the university, within limits. He favors incorporating profit
incentives into traditional university functions of research and teaching while placing limits on profit-seeking ventures to avoid excessive
conflict with academic values such as free and open scientific inquiry,
collegiality and trust, scholarly integrity, and public moral standing of
the university.
Locating Bok's position on this spectrum facilitates comparison
of his philosophy with others. In supporting market-based universityindustry relations with some restrictions, Bok's views differ from those
31
32
33

34
35
36
37

See
Id.
See
See
Id.
See
Id.

id. at 173-78.
at 15.
id. at 28, 76-77, 140-41; infra notes 62-64, 134 and accompanying text.
BOK, supra note 1, at 27-28.
at 29.
id. at 29-32.
at 32.
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who view university commercial activities as intrinsically bad. 38 Individuals who believe that market-based ventures are always at odds with
academic values base this opposition on the clash of private-market
and university values. 39 Private-market activity values profit-making in
the private interest of the market actor. 40 Business employers also
value unilateral control of property-including product design, trade
secrets, and employment decisions affecting employees-to increase
their power in the market system. 4 1 Unilateral control, secrecy, and
private gain contradict the academic values of dissemination of ideas,
academic freedom, faculty governance, and public interest mission. 42
Critics strongly opposed to university commercialization, therefore,
find it illusory to believe that private market-based ventures in the uni43
versity can coexist with academic values.
Those holding the second position on the spectrum recognize
the inconsistency between academic values and market values but believe that such harm is justified under certain circumstances. 44 Even if
See, e.g., infra note 43.
Cf Krimsky, supra note 4, at 38-39 (articulating how the commercialization of scientific research has compromised the traditional norms of scientific practice at
universities).
40
See STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE KNOWLEDGE FACTORY: DISMANTLING THE CORPORATE
UNIVERsrrY AND CREATING TRUE HIGHER LEARNING 158 (2000) (showing how universities
become driven by the bottom line when corporatized).
41
See, e.g., infra notes 181-83.
42
For excellent discussions of the traditional communal values of academic science,
see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ProprietaryRights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,
97 YALE L.J. 177, 181-84 (1987); Arti Kaur Rai, RegulatingScientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 88-94 (1999); see also Krimsky, supra
note 4, at 29-39 (discussing "[t]
he impact of university-industry relationships on the behavior and values of scientists").
43
See ARONOWITZ, supra note 40, at 158-59 (accusing universities of confusing the
distinctions among "training, education and learning" by prioritizing receipt of grant
money over student preparedness); NOBLE, supra note 12, at 61-82 (using UCLA's relationship with a private company, designed to enable the delivery of distance education as "a
cautionary tale in the commodification of higher education," id. at 80); Krimsky, supra note
4, at 35, 39 (arguing that the privatization of medical knowledge through patenting results
in duplicative research that is contrary to traditional communal norms); Lieberwitz, supra
note 11, at 134-35 (calling the corporatization of education "inimical to principles of academic freedom"); Risa L. Lieberwitz, University Science Research Funding: Privatizing Policy
and Practice, 65-70 (Apr. 21, 2003), at http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/cheri/conf/chericonf
2003/chericonf2003_08.pdf (focusing on university research in life sciences to explore
whether increasingly close ties with industry threaten fundamental academic values).
44
See David Bollier, Preserving the Academic Commons, Keynote Remarks at the
American Association of University Professors 89th Annual Meeting (June 13, 2003), at
http://web.cornell.edu/UniversityFaculty/
(posted at Forums/Discussions, Corporate
Strategic Alliances) (strongly criticizing commercialization of the university, including patenting of academic research, as harmful to the public domain and the public interest, but
also identifying a legitimate role for university-industry partnerships and technology transfer in the social contexts of tight university budgets and advanced technologies.); Arti K.
Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,91 AM. SCIENTIST
52, 55, 57 (2003) (expressing strong "[c]oncern about an 'anticommons' or 'property
rights thicket"' resulting from the proliferation of patents and exclusive licenses on feder38
39
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these critics would sometimes agree with supporters of commercialization concerning universities' decisions to enter specific market ventures, their analysis proceeds from a philosophically different starting
45

point.

Bok provides a decisionmaking process to guide university officials in choosing between commercial activities that will benefit the
university and those that will harm academic values. 46 He recognizes
that the lure of potential profits in the face of rising costs and funding
needs may induce university officials to accept proposals for new or
expanded profit-based programs. 4 7 In contrast, it may be easier for
university administrators to ignore the cumulative negative impact on
academic values from profit-motivated programs, given the less tangible nature of values such as public trust, academic standards, and free
exchange of ideas and information. 48 To avoid this ad hoc process
favoring short-term profits over long-term academic institutional integrity, Bok recommends that universities "look at the process of commercialization whole, with all its benefits and risks, and then try to
develop clear rules that are widely understood and conscientiously enforced. ''4 9 Bok counsels, therefore, that "[u] nless the system of governance has safeguards and methods of accountability that encourage
university officials to act appropriately, the lure of making money will
gradually erode the institution's standards and draw it into more and
more questionable practices." 5 0
While cautioning against the attraction of potential profits, Bok's
further description of the university governance system reinforces his
positive evaluation of university market activities. Bok envisions the
faculty acting as partners with the administration to choose and design commercial ventures that are both profitable and consistent with
academic values. 5 1 In Bok's view, fostering faculty debate can save the
university from entering into "hasty, misguided profit-seeking ventures," 5 2 though the forms of faculty governance may need to be modified to "fit the special circumstances of new entrepreneurial
ally funded basic research, but describing a need for patents and licenses for research
discoveries that "undoubtedly require substantial commercial investment to become reliably mass-produced for widespread distribution").
45
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
46
See BOK, supra note 1, at 118-21.
47
See id. at 119-20.
48
See id. at 105-18.
49
Id. at 121.
50
Id. at 185.
51
Id. at 189. Bok presents this vision as a query: "How can [university governance]
combine the desire of energetic university leaders to innovate and adapt to new pressures
and opportunities with the faculty's sensitivity to the importance of preserving basic academic values?" Id.
52
Id. at 192.
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ventures. ' 5 3 Moreover, Bok concludes that faculty participation in the
design and implementation of commercial activities affecting teaching and research will more likely lead to program development consis54
tent with academic values.
II
BOK's LINE DRAWING: GOOD AND BAD
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

A.

Athletics

Bok distinguishes particular university commercial activities that
he views as beneficial from those that he views as harmful to academic
values. Though he recognizes the difficulty of reforming deeply entrenched intercollegiate sports programs, he believes that meaningful
reforms are both possible and necessary, including "measures that
strengthen the will to protect academic values and lessen the incentive
to win at any price. '55 Bok's recommendations focus on agreements
56
among colleges to adopt measures such as sharing athletic revenues;
57
setting minimum admissions requirements; eliminating freshman el58
igibility, "at least in the high-pressure, revenue-producing sports;"
abolishing athletic scholarships; 59 limiting the influence of coaches in
admissions decisions; 60 and scheduling games not to interfere with ac6
ademic courses. '
B.

Research

Bok does not recommend amending or repealing the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980, which permits universities to patent inventions resulting
from federally funded research. 62 Instead, he concludes that the
profit motive in academic research actually contributes to the public
interest by encouraging universities "to scour their labs" 63 for research
that industry could "put to practical use" 6 4 by licensing universityowned patents. Bok objects, however, to excessive profit-seeking behavior that interferes with advancement in academic research or un53
54
55
56
57
58

59
60
61
62

Id.

See id. at 193.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 133, 137.
See Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.

§§ 200-212 (2001)).
63
BOK, supra note 1, at 141.
64
Id. at 28.
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dermines public trust in universities. 65 He notes the harms resulting
from expanded university-industry contact through technology transfer and corporate funding of university research: undue secrecy, conflicts of interest, and corporate influence over academic research. 66
Bok's recommended reforms envision university administrations as
buffers between individual faculty and corporate funders, monitoring
relations between faculty and corporations that may undermine academic values. To this end, Bok counsels universities to review facultyindustry research funding contracts and "resist" provisions that require excessive secrecy after faculty completion of research, limit researchers' communications with colleagues, or provide corporate
67
funders with the opportunity to influence research findings.
Much of Bok's research discussion addresses conflicts of interest
by individual science faculty that "arise in 'situations in which financial or other personal considerations may compromise, or have the
appearance of compromising, an investigator's professional judgment
in conducting or reporting research.' "68 Only in the case of research
involving human subjects does Bok recommend prohibiting research
by faculty with financial interests in corporations that are funding the
research. 69 For other research, though, he concludes that required
disclosure of potential conflicts of interest will adequately protect academic values of objective and disinterested research and public
trust. 70 Bok is most concerned with disclosures of faculty financial in-

terests in corporations, such as stock ownership or ongoing consulting
fees that may be affected by that faculty member's research findings. 71
He describes, in particular, the conflict of interest present in faculty
involvement in clinical trials of drugs manufactured by pharmaceutical manufacturers who fund the faculty member's research. 72
Bok is less concerned with conflicts of interest at the institutional
level of the university. He does criticize universities who bid on corporate research contracts for clinical drug trials, particularly in light of
the questionable academic value of such research. 73 Bok also proposes a partial reform of university technology-transfer practices in relation to federally funded research, recommending against exclusive
65
66

Id. at 30-32.
Id. at 64-76, 141-56.
67
Id. at 143-44.
68
Id. at 66-67 (quoting Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., Guidelinesfor Dealing with Conflicts of
Commitment and Conflicts of Interest in Research, 65 AcAn. MED. 491 (1990)).
69
Id. at 145.
70
See id. at 146-49.
71
See id. at 67 (arguing that the appearance of bias due to a faculty member's financial interest is enough to undermine his or her credibility).
72
See id. at 67-75.
73
See id. at 70-71, 150-51 (noting that these monies are often sought for non-academic purposes).
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corporate licenses on university-owned patents for basic research tools
that are important in early-stage "upstream" science research.74 Such
exclusive corporate control on basic research tools impedes further
research advances. 75 He suggests that congressional action could support this institutional reform by providing the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) with authority to restrict fund recipients from issuing
76
exclusive licenses on such federally funded basic research tools.

Bok pays little attention to the faculty and university conflicts of
interest created by the recent phenomenon of large-scale corporate
funding of entire departments or research programs. He describes
only the well-publicized example of $25 million of funding over five
years from Novartis Company to the Department of Plant and Microbial Biology of the University of California at Berkeley. 77 In exchange,
Novartis received seats on the departmental research committee and
exclusive licenses to the university-owned patents on one-third of the
research conducted by the department. 78 Because he concludes that
such large-scale corporate funding is unlikely to proliferate, Bok finds
no current need for reform to limit such funding arrangements. 79
C.

Teaching

In his initial chapter on teaching, Bok counters arguments that
market-based distance learning for profit will undermine faculty governance and lead to exploitation of faculty involved in such programs.8 0 In Bok's view, such arguments ignore the faculty's power
and the market's role in providing a voice for students concerning
their curriculum.8 1 Further, Bok presents the benefits of using distance learning profits to support traditional teaching and research
programs on campus.8 2 Yet, in his second chapter on teaching, Bok
recommends that universities avoid the "treacherous course

8

3

of

"try[ing] to use the Internet for profit, especially when they join with
venture capitalists to achieve their ends. Even if [the universities] retain a controlling interest in the new distance learning organization,
their partners will insist on certain rights to protect their invest74
75
76

See id. at 142.
Id.

Id.

Id. at 151-52. Bok notes that this funding comprised approximately thirty to forty
percent of the department's entire research budget. Id. at 151.
78
Id.; see Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar.
2000, at 39, 39-40.
79
See BOK, supra note 1, at 152-53.
80
Id. at 92-98.
Id. at 95-98.
81
82
Id. at 97.
83
Id. at 169.
77

774
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ments. ''84 Further, Bok asserts that "universities... make a mistake if
they launch ... academic initiatives . . . with the primary aim of mak85
ing a profit rather than serving some substantial academic purpose."
Any revenues gained through distance learning programs in a nonprofit organizational structure can help improve educational quality
86
for all students.
III
BoK's PERSPECTIVE:

A

NARROWED VISION PRODUCES

A POSITIVE OUTLOOK

A.

Bok's Restricted Definition of the Scope of University
Commercialization

In identifying "good" commercial activities, such as increased university patents and licenses, and "bad" commercial activities, such as
pharmaceutical funding of continuing medical education, Bok fails to
take his own advice to "look at the process of commercialization
whole, with all its benefits and risks."8 7 Had he seriously engaged in
this analysis, he would have found it harder to sustain his positive outlook on the growth of commercial activities in the university. Bok's
argument for using a broad-based, long-term decisionmaking process
presents, by far, the strongest analysis in the book. In counseling university officials to consider the cumulative long-term effects of commercialization on intangible academic values, Bok recognizes that the
concrete nature of immediate demands for revenue may induce university officials to respond positively to proposals for new or expanded
profit-based programs.8 8 In contrast, the negative impact on academic values may be easier for university administrators to ignore,
given the less tangible nature of values such as openness of academic
exchanges and importance of maintaining the public trust. Bok thus
counsels replacing an ad hoc process-in which academic values will
invariably lose-with a broad-based structure of institutional decisionmaking that considers the full scope, depth, and reach of potential
harm to academic values resulting from university market activities.8 9
84

Id.
Id. at 166.
86 See id. at 171-72.
87 See id. at 121; see supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
88 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. Bok also recognizes that even the
lure of short-term profits may be illusory as universities launch programs that are touted as
providing great profit potential but that fail to provide sufficient revenues to cover even
their own costs. BOK, supra note 1, at 100-01. This has been the case for universities
entering failing, for-profit distance learning ventures and for universities yielding disappointing revenues through expanded technology transfer offices to patent and license
faculty research. Id.
89
See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
85
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The problem is that Bok himself refuses to "look at the process of
commercialization whole." 90 The contradiction stems from Bok's selfimposed restriction on the scope of commercial activities that he will
consider. In defining commercialization to refer only to "efforts to
sell the work of universities for a profit,"9 1 Bok explicitly excludes
from his definition-and, therefore, from his analysis-the impact of
developments that other critics have included as part of the commercialization or corporatization trends. 92 Such developments include
the expansion of commercial programs or vocational courses, the increase in teaching by adjunct faculty and graduate students, and the
growing use of corporate business methods by university administrations. 93 In addressing only the financial aspects of such trends, Bok
fails to confront the institutional nature of changes resulting from the
university's adoption of a corporate business model. Such changes
flow from the university's profit-seeking activities together with
changes in employment, such as the weakening of the tenure system
that protects faculty job security and academic freedom. 9 4 In omitting
these issues from his definition of commercialization, Bok inadequately addresses the problem of university commercialization. The
excluded developments import market values into university policies
and practices. Each development should be analyzed individually as
part of the broader commercialization trend. Furthermore, the definition of commercialization must include all relevant issues in order
to reflect the cumulative impact on academic values resulting from
the full range of university commercial activities. Certainly, this
broader scope is more consistent with Bok's call for a broad-based and
long-term analysis to safeguard academic values.
Bok explains his rejection of a broader scope of analysis: "Often,
words such as commercialization, corporatization, or commodification are
90
91

BOK, supra note 1, at 121.
Id. at 3.

See id. For examples of critiques of university corporatization that address developments excluded by Bok, see ARONOWITZ, supra note 40, at 158-64 (critiquing the modern
university in the United States for using the business corporation as an institutional model
and for serving corporate interests through increased vocational curricula and commercial
research programs); CHALK LINES, supra note 10 (critiquing the influence of corporate
business practices and the ideology of global capitalism on the university in regard to
faculty employment, distribution of resources to academic programs, commercialization of
research, and faculty-graduate student relationships); NOBLE, supra note 12 (linking university administrators' advocacy of distance learning to their attempts to restrict faculty
employment and autonomy); BILL READINGS, THE UNIVERSIh'I IN RUINS 11 (1996) (critiquing the transformation of the university into "a bureaucratically organized and relatively
autonomous consumer-oriented corporation"); Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 85-87, 128-30
(describing the corporatization of the university as the cumulative effect of the application
of a business model to weaken the tenure system, increase the commercialization of research, and enter into for-profit education ventures).
93 See supra note 92.
94
See infta notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
92
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employed for rhetorical purposes to capitalize on the widespread distrust of business and business methods in academic circles." 95 In trivializing broader critiques of university commercialization by labeling
them as mere rhetorical devices, Bok reinforces his own positive views
of university-industry relations. Bok thus separates himself from scholars to his political left, particularly those in opposition to all university
commercial activity. 9 6 As a result, however, Bok fails to present a complete and integrated analysis of the sources and scope of the commercialization of the university.
B.

Bok's Restricted Analysis of the Reasons for University
Commercialization

Having restricted his definition of commercialization, Bok further limits his analysis in discussing the reasons for current commercial trends in the university. He concludes that the current trends,
while "unprecedented [in] size and scope," 97 are simply "the latest in
a series of steps to acquire more resources beginning ... in the early
twentieth century."9 8 Again, Bok separates himself from a broader perspective, rejecting the theory of "[c] ritics from the left" that "the burgeoning commercial activity on campus

.

.

.

is simply another

illustration of the attempts by the businessmen and lawyers who sit on
boards of trustees to 'commodify' education and research, reduce the
faculty to the status of employees, and ultimately, make the university
serve the interests of corporate America." 9 9 While he acknowledges
increasing market influence on universities, Bok rejects as "rather farfetched" the idea of a national corporate plot "to bend universities to
their corporate purposes." 10 0
Through his caricature of "critics from the left" as simplistic conspiracy theorists, 10 1 Bok ignores the pressures that recent global privatization trends have placed on the university. More than a simple
increase of market influence, the unprecedented growth in private
corporate power has led to qualitative changes in public institutions,
including the privatization of public utilities and services.10 2 By insisting that current university commercialization is simply part of its traditional search for funds, Bok denies the relevance of these broader
privatization trends to the recent shift in university-industry relations,
which have brought corporations more directly into the core univer95
96
97

98
99
100
101
102

supra note 1, at 3.
See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
BOK, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
See id. at 6-7.
See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
BOK,
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sity functions through patenting and licensing practices, direct corporate funding of entire academic departments, faculty as corporate
founders and consultants, and for-profit distance learning corporations. 103 Like his overly narrow definition of university commercialization, Bok's refusal to explore this social and economic context is
inconsistent with his call for broad analysis of the effects of commercialization on the university's institutional .values.
IV
EXPANDING THE CRITIQUE: AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF UNIVERSITY COMMERCIALIZATION

A.

The Social and Historical Context of University
Commercialization

Had Bok taken his own advice to "look at the process of commercialization whole, 1 0 4 how might his analysis have changed? Bok ignores several key aspects of university commercialization that reveal
the deep threat to the university's public mission. First, Bok's failure
to analyze recent university commercialization within a social and economic context ignores the relationship between university commercialization and broader privatization trends.
University
commercialization must be analyzed as part of societal changes in the
defined missions of public institutions. Beginning in the 1980s, global

privatization trends transformed public governmental functions into
private market activities, including government subcontracting with
private corporations to deliver services such as public utilities, water,
education, and prison management. 10 5 In the United States, deregulation of industries, such as airlines and energy, has increased corporate power over consumers. 10 6 Privatization also has been promoted
through the increased presence of for-profit businesses into formerly
10 7
nonprofit fields, as in health care in the United States.
Current commercialization trends raise the issue of whether universities are privatizing their traditional public mission, acting increasingly in their own financial interests and in the interests of corporate
103

See BOK, supra note 1, at 7-8.

104
105

Id. at 121.

SeeJody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 155 (2000); Tony
Prosser, Social Limits to Privatization,21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 213, 216-18 (1995). See generally
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets
More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 1477 (2001) (analyzing
privatization trends of traditional government services in the global context).
106
See Aman, supra note 105, at 1491-98; Prosser, supra note 105, at 217-18.
107
See Theodore R. Marmor, Mark Schlesinger & Richard W. Smithey, A New Look at
Nonprofits: Health Care Policy in a Competitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313 (1986); Lawrence E.
Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and FederalResponse to Hospitals' Changes in Charitable Status, 23 Am. J.L. & MED. 221 (1997).
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donors and licensees. Within this broader context, the "unprecedented" size and scope 0 8 of private market activities in the university
indicates more than a new form of fundraising. Rather, the university's commercialization parallels the privatization of other public institutions.' 0 9 If university commercialization is understood as part of
an institutional challenge to its public mission, the decision whether
to engage in commercial activities becomes central to the protection
of academic values.
The university's response to corporate power in the industrial era
demonstrates the centrality of university independence to institutional
identity. In 1915, at the zenith of industrialization, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) formed in reaction to the
discharge of faculty whose teaching and research conflicted with the
interests of powerful corporate donors. 110 The newly formed AAUP
demanded faculty rights of academic freedom essential to fulfilling
the university's mission to serve the public good, independent from
interference by boards of trustees, university officials, industrialists, or
legislators.' 11 The AAUP's actions were highly successful, leading to a
strong tradition of academic freedom to support the public interest
mission of the university. The Association of American Colleges and
more than 150 academic professional organizations and universities
endorsed the 1940 AAUP Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reinforcing the role of higher education in contributing to the "common good" 112 rather than acting in individual or
institutional interests. 11 As this early history reveals, protecting the
university from intrusion by corrupting influences is fundamental to
the institutional principles of independence, academic freedom, and
1 14
public mission.
BOK, supra note 1, at 2.
See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1665-66.
See RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC
110
FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 468-70, 470 n.5 (1955) ("[1]t has been argued .. .that
boards of trustees are allied with business."); see also ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, No IVORY
TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES 16-18 (1986) (suggesting that, although academic freedom was not explicitly espoused as the impetus behind the AAUP, it certainly
must have contributed to its foundation).
11
See 1915 Declaration of Principles, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: A HANDBOOK
OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 155, 166-68 (Louis Joughin ed.,
1967) [hereinafter 1915 DeclarationofPrinciples];J.Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special
Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 273-79 (1989); Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265,
1275-81 (1988).
112
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (B. Robert Kreiser ed., 9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter 1940 Statement].
113
See 1915 Declaration of Principles, supra note 111, at 166-67 (discussing the "special
dangers" posed to freedom of teaching by these conflicting motivations).
114 See Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 77-85. The organizational history of the AAUP in
relation to American universities also shows that "academic freedom" developed as a pro108

109
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Guarding basic academic values requires a suspicion of the presence of corporate interests in the university. Most faculty continue to
hold this strong presumption against the legitimacy of corporate influence. 1 15 In terms of the current spectrum of attitudes regarding commercialization of the university, most faculty hold the first or second
positions, premised on the belief that university commercial activity is
bad." 6 Despite Bok's warnings of the dangers of excessive university
commercialization, he embraces the positive potential of increased
university-industry contacts. 1 1 7 His adherence to the third position on
the spectrum-that university market activities are good, within limits-represents a major shift from the traditional suspicion of business
interests as a threat to university independence.
B.

The Commercialization of Research: Institutional Conflicts of
Interest
1. PrivatizingPublicly Funded Research: The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980

Of all the commercialization trends that Bok addresses, he is
most enthusiastic about the federal Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.118 The Act
authorizes and encourages nonprofit organizations-including universities-and businesses to apply for patents on inventions arising
from use of federal research funds.1 1 9 Bok's analysis omits serious discussion of the central role of the Act in privatizing the university's
research function. Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, federal law granted the
government title to inventions developed with federal funds, placing
these inventions-including academic research-in the public domain.1 20 The government could dedicate the invention to the public
domain by publishing the results without obtaining a patent or by providing nonexclusive licenses to private parties seeking use of a governfessional norm, apart from rights that the judicial and legislative systems created. See id. at
89. As a body of "extra-legal" rights, professional academic freedom remains an essential
source of protection for faculty in public and private universities, particularly in light of the
limited scope of constitutional academic freedom, which applies only to public sector

faculty, and which courts have interpreted narrowly. See id. at 89-92.
115
Cf supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing negative attitudes toward
university commercialization).
116
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
117
See supra text accompanying note 38.
118 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-212 (2001)).
119
See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1665-66. The Bayh-Dole Act originally limited its
authorization for patenting rights to universities, other nonprofit organizations, and small
businesses. Id. at 1691, 1694-95. However, an amendment to the Act soon extended such
authorization to all businesses receiving federal research funds, regardless of size. Id. at
1694-95, 1707 n.180. The extension of the Act was accomplished first by a Presidential
Memorandum in 1983 and then by a 1984 congressional amendment to the Bayh-Dole Act.
Id.
120
See id. at 1675-76.
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ment-owned patent. 12' Placing academic research in the public
domain was consistent with the university culture of free exchange of
122
research ideas and research in the public interest.
Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act soon after the mid-1970s
revolution in university genetics and biotechnology research, which
1 23
resulted in scientific discoveries with great commercial potential.
After Bayh-Dole, universities could seek to profit-from royalties and
licensing fees earned from patents on academic research discover125
ies. 124 Because most university science research is federally funded,
the Bayh-Dole Act was instrumental in encouraging universities to
commercialize their research through contracts with industry, including the exclusive licensing of university-owned patents to for-profit
corporations. 26 In 1979, before the Bayh-Dole Act, U.S. universities
obtained only 264 patents; in 1997, U.S. universities obtained nearly
ten times that number, at 2,436 patents.1 2 7 In fiscal year 2000, U.S.
universities filed 8,534 patents, an increase of 12% over 1999.128 From
1980 to 1990, patent applications on NIH-funded inventions increased
by almost 300%.129 Surveys of U.S. universities in 1991 and 2000 show
that during that period new patent applications increased by 238%,

121 See id. Prior to Bayh-Dole, a government agency could apply for a patent on federally funded inventions, rather than placing the inventions directly into the public domain,
in order to ensure that a private party did not apply for a patent on the same invention and
to avoid litigation over the issue of prior publication of the inventions. Id. In some agencies, a university or other government contractor could petition to shift title from the government to the contractor. See id. at 1683-84, 1691-92.
122 See Krimsky, supra note 4, at 39.
123 See id. at 18-21 (describing the scientific research and industrial climate that the
revolution in biology and chemistry had created, leading to passage of the Bayh-Dole Act).
124 See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1663-65.
125
MARTIN KENNEY, BIOTECHNOLOGY. THE UNIVERSI-Y-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 34-36
(1986). Since the post-VAWWII period, federal funding has consistently been the most important source of university research financial support, ranging from approximately sixty
percent to seventy percent of university research funding since 1960. Id. at 13-15, 35-36;
Sheila Slaughter & Gary Rhoades, The Emergence of a Competitiveness Research and Development
Policy Coalition and the Commercialization of Academic Science and Technology, 21 ScI., TECH., &
HUM. VALUES 303, 327 (1996). Public funding has remained important for university life
sciences in particular, with public funding estimated at seventy to eighty percent of total
funding for university life sciences research. David Blumenthal, Conflict of Interest in Biomedical Research, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 377, 380-81 (2002).

126 Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 196. Where the federal fund recipient chooses to apply for a patent, the federal funding agency retains only a nonexclusive license to use the
publicly funded invention. Id.
127 Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 53.
128 Goldie Blumenstyk, Income from University Licenses on Patents Exceeded $1-Billion,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 22, 2002, at A31.
129 Krimsky, supra note 4, at 22.
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licensing agreements increased by 161%, and royalties increased by
more than 520%.130
Increased university-industry contact under Bayh-Dole also led to
further corporate involvement in the university, with increasing corporate funding of academic research-including millions of dollars to
fund entire departments or research programs-in exchange for exclusive corporate licenses to research results. 13' Although public
funds remain the greatest source of research support, corporate funding has grown significantly, increasing by 93% between 1980 and
1984,132 with industry financing of the life sciences increasing from
7% of all academic scientific research in 1993 to nearly 11.7% in
1994.13

Bok accepts at face value the premise underlying the Bayh-Dole
Act that promoting commercialization of publicly funded research is
in the public interest. He repeatedly expresses his agreement with
this change in policy, concluding that "the profit motive proved decisive in causing universities to fulfill their responsibility to serve the
public."'1 34 Bok claims that "[o] nly when Congress expanded .. . patent[ ] and... royalt[y rights were universities motivated to] mount a
serious effort to help the public gain a greater return on the billions
of tax dollars invested in academic research."' 3 5 Bok even asserts that
"[a] iding business [through technology transfer] is increasingly recognized as an explicit part of the mission of research universities" 13 6 and
that the potential profits from patents "keep scores of institutions
scouring their labs for commercially valuable innovations.'

3

7

This,

Bok concludes, demonstrates that "commercial incentives have succeeded in encouraging universities to do a much better job of serving
the public interest."'13

8

Though he recommends reform to curb the

excesses of university patent and licensing practices, Bok defends the
Bayh-Dole Act, university exploitation of patents, and licensing of publicly funded research: "In seeking royalties, [universities] are merely
doing what the law allows and Congress clearly meant to encourage.
Since there are plausible reasons to support the government's policy,
any argument to the contrary should be taken up with Congress, not
130
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, Sci.,
Aug. 22, 2003, at 1052. The Association of University Technology Managers reports that
half of the licenses are exclusive. Id.
See, e.g., supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
131
132
Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 178 n.2.
133
David Blumenthal et al., Relationships Between Academic Institutions and Industry in the
Life Sciences-An Industry Survey, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 368, 369 (1996).
134
BOK, supra note 1, at 28.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 63.
1-7
Id. at 77.
138
Id.
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the universities."] 39 Bok's statements reveal his blind faith in the market as a vehicle to serve the public interest. He unquestioningly accepts the Bayh-Dole Act's justification of the privatization of federally
funded research, which equates the public interest with the corporate
interest. According to this reasoning, encouraging universities to seek
profits through patents and licenses will increase the number of commercially available products and thereby serve the public interest.
This is highly questionable, given the tension between the goals of
profit-making and serving the public good. 14° Although Bok mentions the concern that Bayh-Dole "subordinate [s] the public aims of
research to private ends," 14 1 he fails to discuss the issue further. A
closer analysis reveals that Bayh-Dole in fact represents a major departure from the traditional university mission of serving the public by
introducing research into the public domain.
In his enthusiasm for university patenting and licensing activities,
Bok ignores the multiple public costs of privatizing federally funded
research. The public initially pays for such research through tax dollars. 14 2 Under Bayh-Dole, the public pays an additional cost when a
university-owned patent removes the federally funded invention from
the public domain. 14 3 The university's licensing of its patents on federally funded research increases public costs. Because the university's
commercial goals will include maximizing revenue from licensing fees
and royalties, the university's interests will overlap with the corporate
licensee's commercial success, creating a conflict of interest between
private commercial interests and the university's institutional public
mission. The public pays for this conflict, as the university will help to
increase corporate profits through arrangements such as exclusive
corporate licensing rights, thereby enabling corporations to charge
high monopoly prices. Perhaps even more costly to the public is the
university's loss of independence from private corporate interests,
with a resulting loss of institutional legitimacy.
Supporters of the Bayh-Dole Act, including Bok, assert that privatizing federal research results will encourage utilization of federally
funded inventions. 14 4 Bayh-Dole proponents cite evidence of the low
licensing rate of government-owned patents prior to 1980,145 purportedly due to corporate lack of interest in nonexclusive licensing rights
and the difficulty of navigating the bureaucratic morass of federal li139
140
141
142

143
144
145

Id. at 142-43.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
BOK, supra note 1, at 58.
Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1666.
See id.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 141.
See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1702.
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censing regulations. 146 Supporters cite the increase in universityowned patents and corporate licenses as proof that the Act was necessary and successful. 14 7 As Professor Rebecca Eisenberg has argued,
however, statistical evidence concerning pre-1980 licensing understates the actual use of federally funded inventions, given the common
practice of unlicensed use of government-owned patents and the availability of unpatented federally funded inventions.1 48 Even prior to
Bayh-Dole, the Department of Defense (DoD) generally permitted
private contractors to retain title to patents on DoD-sponsored research, leaving government title only to inventions that the defense
industry had chosen not to patent. 149 Agencies such as Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which commonly retained title to federally
150
funded inventions, had a higher licensing rate.
Advocates of Bayh-Dole also overlook the contradiction created
by imposing the patent system on university research. A patent provides the patent holder with a monopoly over use of a patented inven1 51
tion, including the right to control it during the patent period.
Theoretically, the patent holder's monopoly promotes the public
good by providing an incentive for individuals to invent and then to
disclose their inventions to the public.1 52 As Professor Eisenberg has
stated, "patent rights on existing inventions result in a net social loss
ex post, a loss that we endure only to preserve ex ante incentives to
make future patentable inventions."' 153 University researchers do not
need incentives of patent rights as they already have incentives to invent and to disclose. Both the communal values of science and the
professional structure of the university encourage and require univer54
sity scientists to invent and disclose their research to the public.'
These professional incentives have been highly successful, as evidenced by the intense competition among academic scientists to be
1 55
the first to publish their research results and methodology.
The patent system and the university system can, thus, be described as separate entities created to expand the public domain of
See id. at 1663-64, 1676-77; Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 181-82.
147 Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1702 ("[B]ecause of government ownership the results
of government-sponsored research were languishing in the archives.").
148
See id. at 1702-04.
149
Id. at 1702-03.
150
Id. at 1703.
151 As of 1995, the U.S. patent term is twenty years from the date of filing the patent
application; prior to 1995, the term had been seventeen years from the date of issuance of
the patent. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 4-5 (5th ed. 2001);
Dale H. Hoscheit & Lisa M. Hemmendinger, 2000 Cumulative Supplement, in KENNETH J.
146

BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

152
153
154
155

137 (Supp. 2000).

Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1668.
Id. at 1667.
See Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 183-84; Rai, supra note 42, at 88-94.
Rai, supra note 42, at 92.
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knowledge. The patent system is based on private ownership and monopolistic control of inventions in exchange for public disclosure.
From this perspective, the expansion of the public domain justifies
the cost of the patent period; the patent holder will provide the information to the public through the patent application, but the invention will be available to the public only at the end of the patent
period. However, the university, as an institution with a public mission, traditionally places inventions and research developments directly into the public domain through scholarly publications. As
patents are not necessary to provide an incentive to invent and disclose in the academic context, they cannot be justified as a cost of
156
expanding the public domain.
Bok recognizes that the traditional university culture and structure provide faculty with incentive to engage in research without providing for the opportunity to patent their discoveries. 57 He does not
address, however, the manner in which these systemic aspects of the
university serve the university's public mission. Nor does he seriously
address the negative impact of privatization of research on university
culture and values. Bok believes that the patenting and licensing of
federally funded research has not resulted in a major shift of academic science from basic to applied research. 158 This observation
sheds little light on the effects of Bayh-Dole because the line between
basic and applied research has become hazy, particularly in the biomedical field, in which the potential commercial value of basic research becomes clearer early on, shortening the time lag between
basic research and its application. 59 Bok further recognizes that the
current stability of academic values may be attributable to the presence of senior faculty, whose careers developed in a communal academic culture.' 60 He fails, however, to address in depth the danger of
future instability of these academic values, which will rely on graduate
students and younger faculty socialized in a culture emphasizing private ownership and commercial exploitation of academic research
discoveries.
How, then, would Bok curb the excesses of patent and licensing
activities under Bayh-Dole? Bok recommends that universities refrain
See id. at 118-20.
See BOK, supra note 1, at 139-40.
Id. at 142.
159
KENNEY, supra note 125, at 106 ("There is no clear line of demarcation which identifies what research is appropriate for the university or for industry."); see Eisenberg, supra
note 42, at 196, 178 n.1 (defining "'basic research'" as "'pure' research directed solely
toward expanding human knowledge, as opposed to 'applied' research directed toward
solving practical problems," and noting that "whatever validity this dichotomy may have in
other contexts, it is difficult to maintain in the context of contemporary biotechnology
research").
160
BOK, supra note 1, at 204.
156
157
158
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from issuing exclusive licenses for university-owned patents on federally funded basic research tools used broadly in early stage science
research. 16 ' He also supports amending federal legislation to give the
NIH authority to restrict funding recipients from issuing exclusive licenses on such basic tools. 162 While such reforms would significantly

expand the availability of certain research tools, they leave uncontested the legitimacy of private ownership of federally funded research
results, maintaining the viability of university practices of patenting
and licensing academic research.
A recent decision by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, 163 reveals the negative impact of university patenting and licensing practices on the university's institutional identity. In Madey v. Duke University,16 4 plaintiff

Madey sued Duke University for patent infringement based on Duke's
use of Madey's patented laser technology in the Duke physics department. 165 The district court held that that the common law "experimental use" exemption immunized from patent infringement liability
Duke's use of the patented laser technology "solely for research, academic or experimental purposes."166 The Federal Circuit reversed,
holding that universities, in using patented inventions to carry out academic research, do not fall within the experimental use exemption
under patent law. 167 The circuit court emphasized that the experimental use exemption is a narrow, judicially created exemption from
enforcement of patent infringement claims, covering only research
carried out merely "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry." 168 The court found no basis for applying the experimental use exemption more liberally to nonprofit institutions than to for-profit entities and concluded that Duke's use of the

161

Id. at 142.

162

Id.

163

Congress created the Federal Circuit Court in 1982, eliminating the jurisdiction

over patent appeals by the other United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. BURCHEiEL, supra
note 151, at 5-6.
164 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003).
165 Id, at 1352-53. Madey had been a tenured professor in the Duke University physics
department. After Duke removed him from the position of director of the free electron
laser lab, Madey resigned from the faculty. Duke continued to use Madey's patented laser
technology. Id.
166

Id. at 1355.

167

Id. at 1361-63; see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, Sci., Feb. 14,

2003, at 1018, 1018-19.
168 Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1021 (1989)
("analyz[ing] the proper scope of an experimental use exemption from patent infringement liability").
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patented invention in its regular "business" of engaging in research

169
fell outside the exception's narrow scope.

Given this breadth of reasoning, one could simply critique the
Madey court's holding as an overly narrow view of the experimental
use exemption in the context of the university's general research function. While the court did equate nonprofit and for-profit institutions
under patent law, it did not base its decision on perceived similarities
between universities' and corporations' patenting and licensing activities. 170 Further, the court's interpretation of the experimental use exemption disqualifies even noncommercial academic research,
including basic research without any potential for patenting or licensing. 171 The opinion did, however, note in dicta that Duke's large
technology transfer office engaged in extensive commercial patenting
and licensing activities. 172 It is reasonable to speculate that Duke's
self-serving approach influenced the court. Duke claimed freedom
from patent law enforcement for research without commercial potential, while simultaneously benefiting from patent laws through its own
technology transfer activities, such as collecting royalties and filing
patent infringement claims. 173 Madey may warn of the consequences
of universities' competing identities as institutions with a public mission and as commercial market actors. The immediate repercussions
may be financial and administrative, in terms of the expense and inconvenience in obtaining licensing rights for patented research tools
in academic research. The potential long-term effects, though, are
most important. As universities take on the identity of commercial
corporations, they may lose their unique position in society as institutions trusted to engage in independent research for the public good.
2.

CorporateFunding of University Research: Creating Corporate
Partners

Similar concerns arise in the context of university research
funded by corporations. Bok's analysis of corporate funding concentrates primarily on the content of contractual terms for industry funding of individual faculty research. 174 Recognizing the compromise of
academic values that results from demands by corporate funders, Bok
recommends that universities monitor corporate research funding
169
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.
170
See id. at 1362.
171
Id.
172 Id. at 1362 n.7 ("Duke's patent and licensing policy may support its primary function as an educational institution.... Duke, however, like other major research institutions
of higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an aggressive patent licensing program from
which it derives a not insubstantial revenue stream." (citation omitted)).
173 See Eisenberg, supra note 167, at 1019.
174
See BOK, supra note 1, at 151-53.
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contracts to "resist" provisions requiring "excessive secrecy," permitting corporate influence over research findings, or providing for publication delays of more than three months after completion of
research. 175 Bok also recommends vigorously enforced disclosure requirements for potential conflicts of interest by faculty engaged in corporate-funded research. 1 76 He does not, however, question the
wisdom of university-industry agreements that exchange corporate
funding for guarantees of corporate exclusive licensing rights to university-owned patents resulting from the funded research. Although
he recommends that universities refrain from issuing exclusive licenses to university-owned patents on federally funded early-stage research

tools, 1 7 7

Bok does not discuss this issue in relation to corporate

funding agreements. He is also satisfied that large scale corporate
178
funding is not yet so widespread as to endanger academic values.
Bok understates the growth in corporate funding of the university
and the changes in university-industry relationships. Although public
funds remain the greatest source of research support, corporate funding of academic science research has grown significantly.17 9 A study of
life sciences companies concludes that "life-science firms were significantly more likely to support academic research in 1994 than in
1984."180 Corporations have also expanded large-scale and long-term
funding of university research programs in exchange for exclusive licensing rights to research results. As one scholar has described the
relationship, "[i]n a very real sense, the universities are now experiencing a shift from corporate contribution to corporate investment in
academia." 18 1 For example, in 1974, Harvard entered an agreement
with Monsanto Corporation for a twelve-year, $23 million grant to
Harvard Medical School in exchange for Monsanto's right to a worldwide exclusive license for inventions resulting from this research funding. 18 2 After entering into this agreement, Harvard eliminated its
policy, in existence since 1934, that had required approval from the
175

Id. at 143-44.

176

Id. at 66-71, 145-49.

177

Id.

at 142.

See id. at 152-53 (noting one instance of such funding and expressing concern
should the practice become widespread).
179
See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text. Bok cites the increase of corporations' financial support of total academic research, "from 2.3 percent in the early 1970s to
almost [eight] percent by... 2000." BOK, supra note 1, at 12.
180 Blumenthal et al., supra note 133, at 371 (finding an increase from forty-six to fiftyseven percent of such companies). Another source reports that industry support of university research grew from "$1.45 billion in 1994 to $2.16 billion in 1999, an annual increase
of nearly 10 percent." Charles F. Larson, The Boom in Industry Research, 16 ISSUES IN ScI. &
TECH., Summer 2000, at 27, 27.
181
Charles C. Caldart, Industry Investment in University Research, 8 Sci., TECH., & Hum.
VALUES 24, 25 (1983).
182
KENNEY, supra note 125, at 58.
178
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president and fellows before obtaining university "patents primarily
concerned with therapeutics or public health" and further, requiring
183
that such patents be taken only "for dedication to the public."
Other university-industry large-scale and long-term funding contracts include: the 1982 Washington University-Monsanto agreement
for $23.5 million of corporate funding over five years in exchange for
exclusive licensing rights to patents resulting from the biomedical research;1 8 4 the 1994 MIT-Amgen agreement for $30 million of corporate funding over ten years in exchange for joint rights between the
parties to the resulting patents;1 8 5 the 1997 MIT-Merck agreement for
$15 million of corporate funding over five years in exchange for licensing rights to resulting patents; 186 and the 1998 UC BerkeleyNovartis agreement for $25 million of corporate funding over five
years to the Department of Plant and Microbial Biology in exchange
for exclusive licensing rights to approximately one-third of the Department's discoveries.1 87 In addition to the exchange of funding for
exclusive licenses, these university-industry "partnerships" expand the
role of corporations in determining university research agendas and
increase the presence of corporations in university research laboratories. Universities attract millions of dollars in corporate support by
offering exclusive licenses as well as access to university facilities,
faculty, and graduate students.18 8 The corporation may appoint its
own representatives to research committees in which, along with
faculty and university administrators, they will select faculty proposals
for funding grants. 18 9 Corporate research scientists have access to
university research facilities and the opportunity to consult with
faculty.' 9 0 This close involvement gives corporations the opportunity
183

Eisenberg, supra note 42, at 181 n.9 (quoting DAVID DICKSON, THE NEW POLITICS OF

SCIENCE 89 (1984)).
184
KENNEY, supra note 125, at 67-69; Krimsky,

supra note 4, at 28-29. After being
renewed three times, Monsanto's financing of the university totaled about $100 million.
Krimsky, supra note 4, at 28.
185
SeeAndrew Lawler, Last of the Big-Time Spenders?, SCI,Jan. 17, 2003, at 330, 330-31;
MIT's Alliances with Industry, MIT NEWS, available at http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/nr/
2000/alliance.html#amgen.
186
William H. Honan, CorporationsStill Give, but Also Get, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1998, at
B9.
187
See Lawler, supra note 185, at 330; Colin Macilwain, Berkeley Teams Up with Novartis in
$50m Plant Genomics Deal, NATURE, Nov. 5, 1998 (describing deal prospectively); cf. Kenneth Sutherlin Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 481-507 (1997) (describing in detail
patenting, licensing, start-up corporations, and corporate funding activities at Harvard,
Stanford, and MIT).
188
See KENNEY, supra note 125, at 55-72 (sketching the trend of "one university/one
corporation contracts").
189
Id. at 57.
190
Id.
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to become acquainted with graduate students, who may later be hired
into industry science R&D departments. 19'
In his critique of the commercialization of intercollegiate sports
programs, Bok states that universities "have absolutely no business operating farm systems for the benefit of the National Football League
and the National Basketball Association."' 9 2 It is unclear, however,
why Bok is less concerned with universities' service of industry
through research patenting and licensing activities, both under the
Bayh-Dole Act and through corporate funding agreements. By
"scour[ing]" labs1 9 3 for federally funded research that can be patented and licensed, universities participate in the privatization of their
core research function, sacrificing the university's contribution to the
public domain of research development. Through the cultivation of
large-scale corporate funding of university research programs in exchange for exclusive licensing rights and participation in university
research committees, universities undermine their independence and
abandon their public mission. Bok should have rephrased his own
comment on intercollegiate sports to state: "University research
should not be carried out in the service of the interests of Monsanto,
Novartis, or Merck." In contrast, Bok's positive embrace of the BayhDole Act and corporate funding agreements is at odds with the core
principle of the university's public mission: that serving the public interest is fundamentally different from a university serving either its
own financial interests or the private interests of industry.
Bok's enthusiasm for research market activities also ignores the
link between the university's independence and the faculty's academic
freedom. The emphasis on the commercial potential of research hinders faculty freedom to pursue research agendas in the interest of scientific progress. Though availability of funds generally shapes
research agendas, the priorities of a governmental agency like the
NIH are more likely to reflect the goal of serving the public interest
than are the research priorities of corporate supporters. The university further compromises academic freedom by patenting and licensing academic research, thus undermining academia's communal
culture and the associated benefits for scientific progress.
C.

Teaching for the Public Good
1. Rejecting Teaching For-Profit

Bok's analysis of teaching focuses primarily on universities' recent
foray into Internet-based distance learning programs. Universities at191

Id.

192

BOK,

193

supra note 1, at 125.
Id. at 141.
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tracted by the Internet's commercial potential have moved outside of
their traditional nonprofit institutional structures, 94 entering the distance learning market by creating spinoff, for-profit corporations,
such as eCornell.19 5 Similarly, universities have entered contracts to
participate in distance learning programs developed by for-profit corporations, such as the partnerships between University of Chicago or
Columbia University and UNext, a for-profit Internet business
founded by University of Chicago Trustee Andrew Rosenfield and
junk-bond trader Michael Milken. 19 6
Though he recommends against such ventures, Bok does not adequately address the underlying academic values that lead to this conclusion. His views on for-profit distance learning entities stem from
his fear of the inevitable demands of investors and the potential for
compromising educational quality.1 97 He also notes that universities
need not pursue for-profit corporate structures, as they can benefit
from revenue earned in distance learning programs developed as part
198
of their nonprofit structure.
Bok does not, however, explore the major shift in values represented by universities' choices to engage in distance learning programs through for-profit corporations. For-profit distance education
should be rejected not simply because the quality of the product will
suffer, but because the fundamental values of the university will be
harmed.' 99 A deeper analysis is important in order to understand that
for-profit distance learning corporations are part of a pattern of university privatization that threatens to alter the university's mission and
to restrict academic freedom. As with his evaluation of trends in research, Bok does not place for-profit distance education in this
broader context of the privatization of public institutions. By adopting
for-profit corporate structures, universities choose a corporate structure explicitly intended for the private financial interests of shareholders, whether the shareholders are venture capitalists or the university
itself. 20 0 Further, for-profit corporate partners and shareholders in
university spinoff corporations become participants in the core university function of education. As in the university's research activities,
promoting private financial interests creates a conflict of interest with
See id. at 86-92.
See Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 104-35 (analyzing university for-profit distance
learning programs generally and examining Cornell University's for-profit corporation,
eCornell, as a case study).
196
Id. at 104-07; BOK, supra note 1, at 79-81. Some universities have also created
distance learning programs through their nonprofit university structure. Lieberwitz, supra
note 11, at 104.
197
BoK, supra note 1, at 169-72.
198
Id. at 171.
199 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
194

195

200

See

BOK,

supra note 1, at 169.
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the university's public mission. 20 1 In addition, bringing third party
investors into educational decisionmaking sacrifices the university's
20 2
institutional independence.
Bok's analysis of for-profit distance learning programs also understates their threat to faculty academic freedom. Though he cautions
against developing distance education through for-profit corporations, he does not believe that such programs will undermine faculty
20 3
governance and lead to exploitation of distance learning faculty.
Bok concludes that individual faculty would actually gain power to negotiate for favorable contract terms as instructors of distance learning
courses. 20 4 This view, however, mischaracterizes the nature of the
power that faculty gain through academic freedom. Academic free20 5
dom is both an individual and collective right of self-governance.
As individuals, faculty members have academic freedom to determine
20 6
the content of their research, teaching, and extramural speech.
Collectively, academic freedom is expressed through faculty peer review in hiring and promoting colleagues and in participation in academic decisionmaking, such as curricular development, academic
program creation, and student admissions. 20 7 As in research activities,
academic freedom in teaching depends on independence from conflicting private interests, enabling faculty to engage in individual and
collective decisionmaking in the public interest. 20 8 University forprofit distance learning corporations undermine individual and collective academic freedom by shifting decisionmaking authority over
an educational program from the faculty to corporate directors. Shifting the goal of educational programs from promoting the university's

201
202
203

See id. at 66-67.
See id. at 115-16, 129-31.
See id. at 95 (stating that because faculties are "the life-blood" of major institutions,
"senior faculty are likely to hold the whip-hand").
204

Id

205 For a discussion of the historical development of the norm of academic freedom,
see supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text; Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 77-85.
206 See Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 82-85. Extramural speech includes speech
"outside a faculty member's professional duties or disciplinary expertise," whether the
speech was made on or off campus, "thus actually covering intramural and extramural
speech." Id. at 83. It has been accepted as part of professional academic freedom in the
United States since its formulation in the AAUP 1915 Declaration of Principles. Id.; Metzger, supra note 111, at 1275-76 (addressing the AAUP's decision to "abandon academic
freedom's restrictive ordinances"); see also Matthew W. Finkin, "AHigher Order of Liberty in
the Workplace": Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Vortex of Employment Practices and Law, 53
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 357, 372-73 (1990) (analogizing the academic profession's demand for freedom with statutory protections for workplace freedom of speech under the
National Labor Relations Act).
207 Lieberwitz, supra note 11, at 83-86.
208 Id. at 82-86.
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public mission to enhancing private financial interests also com209
promises academic freedom.
Bok also disapproves of profit-making as a primary goal for any
educational program of the university, whether through a for-profit
2 10
entity or within the university's traditional nonprofit structure.
While this is good advice, Bok should have made clear that the university's ability to reject the profit-making goal hinges on its adherence to
its public mission as a public or nonprofit institution. The board of
directors of a for-profit corporation has a fiduciary duty to the shareholders to make decisions that increase profits. 21 1 In contrast, although universities must seek revenues to cover costs, a goal of profitmaking contradicts the university's institutional public mission. To
enable them to pursue goals in the public interest, public and nonprofit institutions receive public subsidies. Such subsidies can be direct, as through public funding, or indirect, as through federal
corporate income tax exemption and federal tax deductibility of donations, 2 12 and as through state sales tax and property tax exemptions. 2 13 Further, though nonprofit corporations may generate
unlimited revenues, the nondistribution constraint prevents nonprofit
corporations from using corporate funds for private inurement, including a prohibition on excessive salaries and rental prices, as well as

209 See id. at 85-86. Bok presents positive views of the role of the market in providing a
voice for students concerning their curriculum. BOK, supra note 1, at 97. While including
students' voices in curricular development may be an important part of applying democratic principles in the university, achieving student participation through a market-based
process conflicts with faculty autonomy and with the value of developing an educational
program in the public interest.
210
See, e.g., BOK, supranote 1, at 164 (addressing the risks of a university hosting executive education programs).
211
TarikJ. Haskins, Look Who's Talking: ExploringNo-Talk Provisionsin MergerAgreements,
70 U. CIN. L. REv. 1369, 1371 (2002).
212
Nonprofit private universities qualify for such exemptions as § 501 (c) (3) organizations serving educational purposes. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2001); Peter D. Blumberg,
From "Publishor Perish" to "Profitor Perish": Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the
§ 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 89, 101-06 (1996); see also Barbara K
Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 555, 560-61 (1998) (discussing taxation of nonprofit organizations); John D. Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (and Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption
for Private EducationalInstitutions),35 ARiz. L, REv. 841, 857-87 (1993) (discussing theories
underlying tax exemptions for private educational institutions).
213 BURTON A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 118, 122 (1988). Private for-profit
businesses, including those in the education field, have complained that such subsidies
give nonprofit universities an unfair market advantage. See Bucholtz, supra note 212, at
569. But these subsidies are intended to provide a favored status to nonprofits to encourage them to serve the public interest rather than the private goal of profit-making.
WEISBROD, supra, at 116-18. For an excellent discussion of a policy proposal to deny the
§ 501 (c) (3) tax exemption to university-industry licensing agreements that are inconsistent
with the public purpose basis for the status, see Blumberg, supra note 212, at 134-46.
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sale of equity capital in the corporation. 21 4 A nonprofit corporation's
profits must be returned to the corporation for use consistent with its
public purpose. 2 15 The lack of a profit-seeking motive for private gain
contributes to the nonprofit's legitimacy and to public trust that its
21 6
work will be carried out in the public interest.
2.

University Commercialization Versus Faculty Academic Freedom:
Attacks on Tenure As Part of Commercialization Trends

The most striking omission in Bok's study is the absence of any
discussion about the recent weakening of the tenure system. In
describing the narrowed definition of commercialization, Bok notes
his exclusion of the university's "efforts to economize in university expenditures (hiring more adjunct teachers) or to use administrative
methods adapted from business."2 1 7 In describing this omission, Bok
fails to note that the increased hiring of adjunct teachers since the
mid-1970s corresponds directly to the decreased hiring of faculty in
tenure-track positions.2 1 8 Again ignoring his own advice to "look at
the process of commercialization whole, with all its benefits and
risks," 2 19 Bok fails to analyze a major trend that is part of the university's adoption of private market models and values. These shifts in
faculty hiring represent a major qualitative change in university hiring
practices, given the contrast between employment conditions and
2 20
rights of "contingent" faculty and those of tenure-track faculty.

Contingent faculty, including adjunct and part-time faculty, are
hired on a temporary basis, without the prospect of gaining the lifetime job security of tenure.22 1 This change in faculty hiring practices
profoundly affects academic values. Since the founding of the AAUP
in 1915, the tenure system has been linked to the faculty right of academic freedom and to the public mission of the university. 22 2 Tenure
gives faculty the freedom to pursue controversial teaching and re214 WEISBROD, supra note 213, at 118 (explaining that IRS "'prohibition of inurement,
in its simplest terms, means that a private shareholder or individual cannot pocket the
organization's funds except as reasonable payment for goods and services'" (quoting IRS
EXEMP-r ORGANIZATIONs HANDBOOK (IRM 7751) § 342.1(1))); see also Blumberg, supra note
212, at 106-08 (describing private benefit rule and its potential application to universities).
215
See Michael B. Goldstein, To Be [For-Profit]or Not To Be: What Is the Question?CHANGE,
Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 31.
216
Cf Bucholtz, supra note 212, at 565 (describing public trust in the quality of nonprofit sector's goods and services).
217
BOK, supra note 1, at 3.
218
See infra notes 236-39 and accompanying text.
219
BOK, supra note 1, at 121.
220
See infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text.
221
See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
222
See 1915 Declaration of Principles, supra note 111, at 168-70.
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search, as well as public speech outside their academic discipline,
223
without fear of retaliation from their university employer.
The tenure system also ensures faculty self-governance through a
peer review system of promotions to tenure. 2 24 Judgments of faculty
teaching and research made in peer review are to be based on the
quality of the faculty's contributions, within a system committed to
free and open inquiry. 225 Though this system is imperfect given the
tenure candidate's vulnerability to the power of tenured colleagues,
the internalized professional norms of academic freedom have placed
important limits on tenured professors' arbitrary or abusive exercise
of power in peer reviews. 2 26 Moreover, tenure review processes of
some universities recognize due process rights through internal uni2 27
versity appeals from negative tenure review decisions.
The weakening of the tenure system and the concomitant increase in contingent faculty are part of the broad trends of privatizing
the university through the application of business models and practices. The tenure system gives the faculty rights of free speech, due
process, 228 and job security that are unheard of in other workplaces in
the United States, where most employees are subject to the commonlaw doctrine of "employment-at-will." 229 Statutes that prohibit discrimination on specific bases, such as race, sex, national origin, disability, age, or union activities, limit the employer's unilateral power

223 See 1940 Statement, supra note 112, at 4 (advising that tenured professors can be
fired only for cause and must receive notice and the opportunity to defend themselves at a
hearing).
224 See Statement on ProceduralStandards in the Renewal or Nonrenewal of Faculty Appointments, in AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 112, at 15 [hereinafter Procedural

Statement].
225 See 1940 Statement, supra note 112, at 4.
226
For commentary that critiques practices, such as the tenure system, that define a
narrow scope of academic freedom, but also recognizes the importance of academic freedom for providing room for free speech and institutional change in teaching and research,
see Craig Kaplan, Introduction to REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS: PERSPECTIVES ON AcADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE 1980s, at 1 (Craig Kaplan and Ellen Schrecker eds., 1983); Bertell
Oliman, Academic Freedom in America Today: A Marxist View, in REGULATING THE INTELLECTUALS, supra, at 45; Frances Fox Piven, Academic Freedom and PoliticalDissent, in REGULATING
THE INTELLECTUALS, supra, at 17.

227 See, e.g.,
ProceduralStatement, supra note 224, at 15; Proceduresfor Appealing a Negative
Tenure Decisions,Academic Policies and Reports, Cornell University Faculty Website, Faculty
Appeals Procedures, http://web.cornell.edu/UniversityFaculty/
(last visited Jan. 13,
2004).
228 See Procedural Standards in Faculty Dismissal Proceedings, in AAUP POLICY DocuMENTS & REPORTS, supra note 112, at 11-14 (supplementing the 1940 Statement by laying
out procedural recommendations and conditions for faculty termination).
229 Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary Notes, 33 AM. J. COMP. L.
310, 310-11 (1985). The employment-at-will doctrine gives employers the power to hire
and fire employees for any reason. Id.
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under the employment-at-will doctrine. 230 Statutory protection places
discrete restrictions on employment at will without generally protecting employees from "unjust dismissals." Though collective bargaining
agreements obligate employers to prove 'Just cause" for discharge,
most employees have no such protection, given the current low rate of
23 1
unionization in the United States.
Contingent faculty, who are hired into nontenure-track positions,
are excluded from the full protections of academic freedom afforded
by tenure, as they remain vulnerable to discharge by the university
employer and are excluded from the university system of faculty selfgovernance. 232 Adjunct and part-time faculty, who are often hired to
teach courses on a "piece rate" basis for low pay and no benefits, are
subject to the employment-at-will doctrine, leaving the university free
not to hire them to teach another course. 233 Other nontenure-track
faculty, such as lecturers with three- to five-year contracts, may be protected from discharge without just cause during the term of their contracts but remain vulnerable to losing their positions at the end of the
2 34
contract.
It is quite surprising that Bok devotes two chapters to university
athletics-which he describes as a "peripheral" activity in the university-but excludes discussion of the weakening of the tenure system,
which will have a severe impact on the university's core research and
teaching functions. Had Bok "look [ed] at the process of commercialization whole, with all its benefits and risks, ' 235 evidence of the dramatic changes in faculty employment would have revealed the
magnitude of the problem created by the university's use of a business
230
Civil service laws for public sector employees and contractual protection for collective bargaining agreements for unionized public or private sector employees provide employees with protection from discharge without just cause. See Charles Feigenbaum, Civil
Service and Collective Bargaining:Conflict or Compatibility?, in LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: READINGS, CASES, AND EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISES 21, 23 (MarvinJ. Levine & Eugene

C. Hagburg eds., 1979). There have been some state common law exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, but these are limited in scope and effectiveness of protection.
See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 70-78 (2000).

231
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2002, Sec. 12, Tbl. No.
628, at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/02statab/labor.pdf (last visited Jan. 13,
2004). The overall rate of unionization in the United States is currently 14.8%. Id.
232 Jane Buck, The President's Report: Successes, Setbacks, and Contingent Labor, 87
ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 18, 19, 21.

233 John C. Duncan,Jr., The Indentured Servants of Academia: The Adjunct Faculty Dilemma
and Their Limited Legal Remedies, 74 IND. L.J. 513, 524-29 (1999); see also NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STUDIES, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 83 (2001), available at http://nces.ed.gov/

pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2001072 (presenting data on percent of faculty employed
part time in Fall 1998) (last visited Jan. 13, 2004) [hereinafter THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION].

234

See Finkin, supra note 206, at 360-61, 364.

235

BOK, supra note 1, at 121.
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model to define faculty rights and status. Employment of part-time
higher education faculty has grown dramatically, with an estimated
133% increase between 1971 and 1986, compared with a 22% increase
in full-time faculty during that same period. 2 36 The percentage of
part-time faculty has been estimated at 33% in 1987, 43% in 1998, and
46% in 2001 .237 Estimates suggest that graduate students and contingent faculty teach more than half the courses offered within some social science and humanities disciplines. 238 The United States
Department of Education reports that approximately four of every ten
instructional faculty in postsecondary institutions worked on a parttime basis during the fall of 1998.239

Even these statistics do not reveal the full threat to academic values. Contrary to Bok's characterization, other developments show
that the increased hiring of contingent faculty is more than a university effort to economize: these trends contain a dimension of increased control over faculty. During the same period, the tenure
system has come under attack as conflicting with a system that motivates high productivity through incentives created by employee accountability and competition. 240 For example, in 1995 the University
of Minnesota Board of Regents attempted to restrict the tenure system
through various measures, including proposals to make it easier to lay
off tenured faculty and to discipline faculty for "not maintaining a
'proper attitude of industry and cooperation.' " 24 1 In 1997, the faculty
and the Board of Regents reached a compromise with a new tenure
code providing for periodic post-tenure reviews leading to possible
pay cuts for poor performance. 2 42 In 1994, Bennington College,
236
Duncan, supra note 233, at 521. One estimate of the rate of part-time teaching
exceeds more than fifty percent of all college classes. Tammie Bob, Degrees of Difficulty;
Part-Time College Teachers Live the Tough Lessons of '90s-Style Economics, CHI. TRIB. MAG., July
12, 1998, at 10, 10-11.
237
Buck, supra note 232, at 20.
238
Id. (citing a recent study by the Coalition on the Academic Workforce). Jane Buck,

President of the AAUP, also cites statistics provided by the Modern Language Association
that full-time tenured or tenure-track professors teach only twenty-eight percent of foreignlanguage courses at doctoral institutions and only twenty-six percent of foreign-language
courses at associate degree-granting institutions. Id.
239
THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION, supra note 233, at 83.
240
See, e.g., Debbie Goldberg, Keeping College Faculties Accountable, WASH. POST EDUC.
REv., July 27, 1997, at R04 (detailing the University of Minnesota's attempts to institute a
new tenure code that would give the administration more control over faculty performance); Renae Merle, Academic Tenure Is Under Fire:Profs Worry for Freedom of Thought, TIMESPICAYUNE, Mar. 23, 1997, at All (discussing new tenure policies in universities in Florida,
Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Texas); Laurel Shaper Walters, Tenure Comes Under
Stricter Review, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 24, 1997, at 12 (examining the trend away
from granting tenure and the arguments on both sides of the debate over the shift).
241
Rene Sanchez, Minnesota Faculty, Regents Put Tenure to the Test; Campus at Center of
Growing Battle overJob Guarantees and Power in Academia, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1996, at A01.
242
The state's Board of Regents' attempt to cut back rights under the tenure system
was met by organized opposition, including a union organizing campaign among the
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which did not have a traditional tenure system, substituted one- to
five-year individual contracts for its "presumptive tenure" system
under which faculty had been reviewed every five years. 243 Following
24 4
this change, Bennington College dismissed one-third of its faculty.
In 1997, Florida Gulf Coast University (FGCU) was founded as part of
the Florida state university system, with distance learning as its focus. 2

45

FGCU hires virtually all faculty on fixed renewable contracts,
24 6

without any tenure system.
Administration and trustee attempts to impose increased regulation on faculty productivity may find some sympathy within a popular
view that tenure simply protects faculty who are underworked and
overpaid. In his general discussion of the relevance of business practices to the university, Bok refers to the popular view that tenured
faculty are free to spend their time at home gardening rather than
writing scholarly publications. 247 As Bok also notes, in reality, the institutional and professional structure of higher education provides incentives for faculty to exercise their autonomy to engage in active
teaching and research programs. 248 Faculty desire for increased professional status and their interest in contributing to the progress of
2 49
their academic discipline provide incentives to faculty post-tenure.
University trustees, more than the general public, are likely to be
aware of continued faculty productivity within the tenure system.
Trustee attempts to restrict tenure rights, therefore, should be viewed
with suspicion as a means of limiting faculty autonomy through the
imposition of business models of employment.
Had Bok described and evaluated the increased hiring of contingent faculty, the decreased hiring of tenure-track faculty, and the direct challenges to the tenure system, the threats to academic values
would have been apparent. Weakening the university tenure systemwhether through the growth of contingent faculty or through direct
faculty. See Sanchez, supra note 241. In December 1996, the faculty voted against the
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changes in rights of tenured faculty-threatens to undermine the system that protects individual and collective rights of academic freedom. The tenure system creates a foundation to support the values
promoted by academic freedom: free expression of controversial ideas
and theories; experimentation with new research agendas; teaching
that challenges majority views; disagreement regarding university policies; full collegial debates on academic decisions, including curricular
development and peer reviews; participation in faculty self-governance bodies, such as faculty senates and policy committees; and public
statements concerning social issues. Without tenure protection,
faculty will be more likely to engage in self-censorship in their individual teaching and research activities, in collective faculty governance
bodies, and in public debates of policy issues. 250 University discharges

of outspoken faculty during the early industrialization period serve as
reminders that faculty are vulnerable without the job security of tenure. 25 1 The erosion of the foundational system of tenure will lead to

an erosion of faculty academic freedom.
Weakening tenure protection and academic freedom will also
strengthen the university's other efforts at commercialization. An essential element of academic freedom is the faculty's right to dissent
from university policies. Nontenure-track faculty cannot afford to criticize the university's commercialization practices, given their vulnerable employment status. Further, universities' hiring practices split the
faculty into first-class, tenure-track or tenured faculty; second-class,
nontenure-track faculty with renewable multi-year contracts; and
252
third-class adjunct faculty working on a semester-to-semester basis.
Drawing status lines weakens the faculty's ability to present a strong
collective front in resistance to university commercialization. Additionally, the university's aggressive actions in undermining the tenure
system are themselves expressions of the administration's power,
which can leave faculty demoralized and discouraged about the prospect of opposing other commercialization programs, such as university-industry "strategic alliances."
CONCLUSION

Commercialization of the university is a crisis for higher education. By bringing market models into the core university research and
teaching functions, universities have damaged their mission to serve
the public. Crucial to the integrity of the university is the independence of faculty and the university from private financial interests, including those of corporate donors. This longstanding principle,
250

251
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established during the industrial era of the early twentieth century,
has been linked to the value of faculty academic freedom to pursue
research and teaching that breaks new ground and challenges the status quo. These well-internalized academic values have created a
strong presumption against the legitimacy of university commercial
activities, given the contradiction between the university's public mission and the private goals of the market.
University commercialization trends should be analyzed against
the social and historical background of university independence and
faculty academic freedom. This approach, in fact, seems to have been
recommended by Bok in counseling that universities should use a
broad-based process in deciding whether to engage in commercial activities. 25 3 As this Book Review has argued, however, Bok makes a well-

advised recommendation and then fails to follow it. In embracing the
positive potential of commercial activities, Bok moves from the traditional premise that the university should not engage in commercial
activities to the view that commercial activities are good as long as
excesses are curbed. Bok ignores the institutional conflict of interests
created by importing commercial activities and private market values
into core university functions.
Had Bok considered the full scope of university commercialization, his positive perspective would have been much harder to sustain.
Analyzing university commercialization within the current context of
widespread privatization trends would have revealed the depth of danger to the university's academic values and public mission. University
patenting and licensing creates a conflict of interest between the university's mission of contributing to the public domain and the private
goal of profiting from university-owned patents. Under the Bayh-Dole
Act, university patenting and licensing of publicly funded research
substitutes private corporate interests for the public interest. The
growth of private corporate funding of specific university research
programs compromises the university's independence through arrangements giving corporate funders exclusive licensing rights to university patents on academic research. For-profit distance learning
corporations reject the importance of nonprofit and public institutional structures to guarding the university's public mission. The
growth of contingent faculty and the weakening of the tenure system
undermine faculty academic freedom to pursue controversial research
and teaching projects.
Separate analysis of each of these developments demonstrates the
threats to the university's institutional integrity and the faculty's academic freedom. Analyzed together, within a broad social and histori253
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cal context, these trends are revealed as part of an integrated pattern
of commercialization and privatization that endangers core academic
values and the public mission of the university. Resisting these commercial activities and the use of market values is essential to the university's preservation of its traditional role of contributing to the
public good and its traditional values of independence and academic
freedom.

